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Abstract. We study a game with strategic vendors who own multiple items and
a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is
to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy
the set of items that maximizes his net payoff.
We show this game may not always have a pure Nash equilibrium, in contrast to
previous results for the special case where each vendor owns a single item. We do
so by relating our game to an intermediate, discrete game in which the vendors
only choose the available items, and their prices are set exogenously afterwards.
We further make use of the intermediate game to provide tight bounds on the
price of anarchy for the subset games that have pure Nash equilibria; we find that
the optimal PoA reached in the previous special cases does not hold, but only a
logarithmic one.
Finally, we show that for a special case of submodular functions, efficient pure
Nash equilibria always exist.
1 Introduction
Consider a scenario in the world of e-commerce, where a single consumer is seeking to
buy a set of products through an online website with multiple vendors, such as Amazon
or eBay. Given the items available for sale and their prices, the buyer will purchase
some subset of them, according to his valuation of the items and their prices.
The vendors strive to maximize their profits—for ease of exposition we assume
production costs are zero, hence profits can be equated with revenues, or the sum of
the prices of their sold items. A vendor can both competitively tailor the set of items
it offers and adjust the prices of these items to react to their competitors.3 Indeed, au-
tomatic mechanisms for rapid online price optimization exist in a variety of markets
and industries [1]. This practice, sometimes called competitive price intelligence [2], is
a growing phenomenon within online retail. The specific question that it addresses is
how a company should price its products in this competitive environment.
Furthermore, as argued by Babaioff et al. [3], such a setting introduces subtle al-
gorithmic questions, since changing the prices of the products may affect the result-
ing revenues in a complex fashion, which may induce responses by one’s competitors.
Therefore, studying the convergence properties of such pricing dynamics is of interest.
3 Note that pricing an item sufficiently high can be regarded as not offering it.
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In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach to price competition among multi-
ple sellers, each with a set of multiple items. As in Babaioff et al. [3], we study a setting
with a single buyer with a (combinatorial) valuation function, taken to be a monotone
and submodular set function over the set of items, which is fully known to the vendors.
However, unlike that earlier work, we examine the more general case where each of the
k vendors controls a disjoint set of items Ai, rather than a single item. Given the prices
of all of the items, the buyer will buy the set with the highest net-payoff (valuation mi-
nus the total price). Our model induces a game in which each of the vendors’ strategy
is a pricing of their items.
Contributions We begin by discussing a related two-phase game, that serves as a way-
station in our study of the main game. In this intermediate game, vendors can only
modify the sets of items being offered, whereas their prices for these items are subse-
quently set by a specific pricing mechanism. We show that this game, resulting only
from this modification of game dynamics (without changing its parameters), has two
critical properties. First, any strategy profile in the original game (a price vector) has a
corresponding strategy profile that results in at least as much revenue for each of the
vendors (Proposition 4.2).
More importantly, we show that for any pure Nash equilibrium in the original game,
there is a corresponding pure Nash equilibrium in the intermediate game, in which each
vendor sells the same items at the same prices as in the original equilibrium (Theo-
rem 4.3). Hence, we reduce the pricing decision to a decision over what items to sell,
allowing a significant simplification of the problem.
We next study basic game theoretic properties of our game. We first show that there
are games which admit no pure Nash equilibrium. To do so, we show that our two-
phase game admits no pure Nash equilibria, which then implies the nonexistence of a
pure Nash equilibrium in the original game, using Theorem 4.3 (see Proposition 5.1).
This result suggests the following question: suppose we restrict attention to instances
of the game that have some pure Nash equilibria—can we then say anything about their
value? To accomplish this, we analyze the price of anarchy (PoA) of this subset of
games, where the objective function in question is the social welfare value, taken to be
simply the buyer’s valuation of the set of items that he purchased. We provide a tight
bound of Θ(logm), where m is the maximal number of items controlled by any of the
vendors.
Finally, as an additional way of dealing with the consequences of Proposition 5.1,
we investigate a special class of valuation functions, which we call category-substitutable,
that, informally, partition products into “equivalence classes” or categories, such that
only a single item will be chosen within a specific category, while different categories
do not influence one another. We show not only that efficient pure Nash equilibria al-
ways exist given such buyer valuations, but also provide a precise characterization of
such equilibria.
2 Previous Work
Multi-item pricing has been a significant topic of research for many years [4, 5], in-
cluding analyses of the price of anarchy (see [6] and follow-up papers). The work of
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Babaioff et al. [3] is the most directly related to the model developed here; indeed, the
game that they study is a special case of our game, in which each vendor sells only
a single item. They show that for a buyer with a general valuation function, a pure
Nash equilibria may not exist, though they prove several properties of the equilibria for
games where one does. Furthermore, for submodular valuation functions (the focus of
our paper), they show not only that pure Nash equilibria exist, but that they are unique4
and efficient—i.e., have a price of anarchy (PoA) of one. In contrast to their setting, we
show that in our more general case there exist games with no pure Nash equilibria. In
cases where they do, we provide a characterization similar to theirs, though in our more
general case, the PoA is significantly higher.
Non-competitive (i.e., single-vendor) optimal-pricing problems have been studied
in the theoretical computer science community. [7] study a number of settings with
multiple buyers possessing various valuation functions. They show that even with unit-
demand buyers and an unlimited supply of each item, selecting the optimal price vector
is APX-hard; they then provide a logarithmic approximation algorithm for the same
case. It should be noted that Babaioff et al. also provide a logn approximation algorithm
for the case of a single vendor, and for that of a single buyer with a submodular valuation
function.
In a recent paper, Oren et al. [8] analyze a model in which fixed prices are given
exogenously, and there are multiple unit-demand buyers. As above, their model as-
sumes an unlimited supply of each item. The strategies of the vendors are which sets
of items to sell. Having the vendor make decisions only about the set of items to sell
has traditionally been studied in the field of operation research. In particular, assort-
ment optimization [9] deals with optimizing a seller’s “assortment” (e.g., his catalog,
or shelf), under various circumstances. Although our game does not fall directly in this
category, we do define a discrete game in which the vendors’ decisions are similar to
those in assortment optimization (although the pricing procedure differs).
3 Preliminaries — The Vendor Competition (VC) Game
We consider the following setting: there is a set of k vendors, with a corresponding
vector of pairwise-disjoint sets of items A = (A1, . . . , Ak), such that |Ai| = ni, and
n =
∑k
i=1 ni. We let A∗ =
⋃k
i=1 Ai.
A strategy profile of the vendors is a price vector p ∈ Rn+, where p(a) denotes the
price of item a according to p. For a set S ⊆ A∗, we let p(S) =
∑
a∈S p(a). For a
vendor i ∈ [k], we let pi ∈ Rni+ denote vendor i’s price vector for the items in Ai, and
as before, for an item a ∈ Ai, pi(a) denotes vendor i’s price for item a according to pi.
For convenience, we will let p−i denote the price vector corresponding to the items not
in Ai (of all other vendors).
The buyer’s valuation function We assume that there is a single buyer with a valuation
function v : 2A∗ → R+; that is, the function v(·) assigns a non-negative value to every
4 More precisely, they give a closed-form characterization of the prices of the items that are
sold.
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bundle (or subset) of items. We let ma(S) = v(S ∪ {a}) − v(S), where S ⊆ A∗,
denote the marginal contribution of item a to the set S. Following [3], we assume
that v(·) is non-decreasing: for S ⊆ T ⊆ A∗, v(S) ≤ v(T ) (implying that v(·) is
maximized at A∗). Furthermore, we assume that the valuation function is submodular:
for S ⊆ T ⊆ A∗ and a ∈ A∗ \ T , we have that ma(S) ≥ ma(T ). Both of these
assumptions are central in the model proposed by Babaioff et al. [3] (although additional
discussion and results are provided for non-submodular functions as well). Note that
v(·) is said to be submodular if the following, equivalent property holds:
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ), for all S ⊆ T ⊆ A∗.
Finally, slightly abusing notation, let the valuation be defined over vectors of item sets as
follows: for S∗ ⊆ A∗, define S = (S1, . . . , Sk) where Si = S∗ ∩ Ai, for i = 1, . . . , k.
Then v(S) = v(S∗). We adapt the rest of our function definitions in an analogous
fashion.
The buyer is assumed to have a quasi-linear utility function: given a vector of prices
p ∈ Rn+, the buyer’s utility for a bundleS ⊆ A∗ is ub(S,p) = vb(S)−
∑
a∈S p(a). The
demand correspondence of the buyer is the family of sets that maximizes his utility:
D(v;p) = {S ⊆ A∗ : ub(S) ≥ ub(S
′), ∀S′ ⊆ A∗}.
The buyer’s decision function X(v;p) ⊆ 2A∗ must satisfy X(v;p) ∈ D(v;p). That
is, given the price vector p, the buyer buys the bundle X(v;p). The buyer’s decision
is said to be maximal (or simply, the buyer is maximal), if there does not exist a set
X˜ ∈ D(v;p) such that X(v;p) ( X˜ . Babaioff et al. [3] showed this property is
critical to ensure the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in their setting. In our work,
we will explicitly state where this property is required.
Vendor payoffs Given the buyer’s decision function X , and a (fixed) price vector p =
(pi,p−i), vendor i’s utility is uXi (p) =
∑
a∈X(v;p)∩Ai
p(a). If the vendors select
mixed strategies, then a vendor’s utility is defined to be his expected utility. Vendor
j’s best response to the other agents’ mixed strategies is a distribution over prices for
Aj that maximizes his expected utility.
This setup defines a game, parameterized by the vector A and the valuation function
v, in which each of the vendors prices his items to maximize his utility. We will refer to
such a game as a vendor competition game, or simply a VC game.
When discussing our special case, in Section 6, we will also make use of the fol-
lowing theorem, which was proved by Babaioff et al.:
Theorem 3.1 ([3]). Consider the case where each vendor owns a single item, that is
ni = 1 for every i = 1, . . . , k; that is, Ai = {ai}, for i = 1, . . . , k. Then if the
buyer’s valuation function v(·) is non-decreasing and submodular, then there exists a
pure Nash equilibrium, p ∈ Rk+, of the following form: for every vendor i, such that
mai(A
∗ \ ai) > 0, p(ai) = mai(A
∗ \ ai), and ai ∈ X(v;p). Also, the payoff of each
vendor i is precisely mai(A∗ \ ai).
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The objective function Given a VC game G = (v,S) and pricing vector p ∈ Rn+, we
use the standard definition of social welfare, namely, the total payoff of all the parties
in the game, including the (non-strategic) buyer. Notice that by this definition, social
welfare is simply the valuation of the set bought by the buyer, v(X(v;p)), since all
payments are simply transferred from the buyer to the vendors. We let f(p) denote the
social welfare resulting from a price vector p.
4 A Related Discrete Game
The game in its current formulation may seem somewhat hard to reason about, due
to large (continuous) strategy spaces.5 To simplify our analysis, we use the following
discrete game, which can be thought of as imposing a specific pricing mechanism given
the vendors’ selection of items (the design of the pricing scheme is influenced by the
results of [3]).
Definition 4.1 (The price-moderated VC game). Given a buyer valuation function
over the vendors’ items, consider the following two-round process:
1. Each vendor i ∈ [k] commits to offering a subset of Si ⊆ Ai of items; this is its
(discrete) strategy;
2. Given the strategy vector S = (S1, . . . , Sk), item prices are set to be their marginal
values. That is, if we set S∗ = ⋃ki=1 Si, then for each a ∈ S∗, the mechanism will
set p˜(a) = ma(S∗ \ {a}). For each item a′ /∈ S∗ the mechanism sets p˜(a′) =
v(A∗) + 1. Let p˜ be the resulting price vector.
The consumer then buys the set X(v; p˜), as before. We call the resulting game a price-
moderated vendor competition game, or more succinctly, a PMVC game.
By analogy to our definitions for the original game, let X ′(v;S) denote the set of items
sold, given the strategy profile S. That is, given the price vector p˜ imposed by the
pricing mechanism in the second round, X ′(v;S) = X(v; p˜). We similarly define a
vendor’s utility to be u′i(Si,S−i), for i ∈ [k].
Note that the specified pricing (v(A∗ + 1)) of items not offered (i.e., not in S∗)
ensures that the consumer will never buy them (i.e., X(v; p˜) ⊆ S∗). Further observe
that the set of price vectors p˜ that correspond to the discrete strategy profiles S in the
PMVC game is a strict subset of the strategy space in the original VC game. We justify
our use of this game in our analysis by establishing the relationship between the original
VC game and the proposed PMVC game, using a number of straightforward results.
Assumption For ease of exposition, we assume that the buyer is maximal. As we shall
see, this implies that X ′(v;S) = X(v;p). However, we can adapt the pricing mecha-
nism by judiciously setting the prices to be slightly below the marginal contributions to
ensure maximality (we leave the details of such a modification to an expanded version
5 In particular, the game is clearly not in normal form. As such, we cannot directly apply Nash’s
theorem about the existence of a mixed equilibrium. We defer the treatment of such equilibria
to future study.
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of the paper). We now describe an important relationship between the VC and PMVC
game that simplifies our subsequent analysis by relating our original model to to a sim-
pler discrete game:
Proposition 4.2. For every strategy profile p in the VC game and valuation v, there is a
strategy profile S in the PMVC game such that X ′(v;S) = X(v;p), and u′i(Si,S−i) ≥
ui(pi,p−i) for each vendor i.
Proof. Let p be a strategy profile in the VC game, and let T = X(v;p). Consider the
strategy profile S where Si = X(v;p)∩Ai, for i = 1, . . . , k, and let p˜ be the resulting
price vector imposed by the pricing mechanism. Furthermore, we let T˜ = X ′(v;S). We
begin by showing that T = T˜ . First, notice that, as for all a /∈ T , p˜(a) = v(A∗) + 1,
and hence item a is not sold, and T˜ ⊆ T . Next, suppose for the sake of contradiction
that T˜ ( T , and let a ∈ T \ T˜ . By the submodularity of the function v(·), we have that
ma(T˜ ) ≥ ma(T ) ≥ 0. This implies that
ub(T˜ ∪ a, p˜) = v(T˜ ∪ a)−
∑
a′∈T˜
p˜(a′)−ma(T \ a)
≥ v(T˜ ∪ a)−
∑
a′∈T˜
p˜(a′)−ma(T˜ )
= ub(T˜ , p˜).
By maximality, the buyer would rather buy item a as well, resulting in a contradiction.
We now claim that u′i(Si,S−i) ≥ ui(pi,p−i). This follows from the fact that
marginal contributions are the maximal prices at which the buyer still buys X ′(v; p˜).
That is, any increase in the price would result in the buyer not buying the product:
ub(T˜ , p˜) = v(T˜ )−
∑
a′∈T˜\a
p˜(a′)−ma(T \ a)
= v(T˜ \ a)−
∑
a′∈T˜\a
p˜(a′) = ub(T˜ \ a, p˜)
⊓⊔
Similarly to the previous proposition, which offered a mapping of strategy profiles in a
way that does not cause the vendor’s utilities to deteriorate, we now show that the same
mapping also preserves Nash equilibria in cases where such equilibria exist. We note
that the following result uses similar arguments to those given by Babaioff et al. [3], for
proving a related characterization of pure Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4.3. For every pure Nash equilibrium p of a VC game there is a pure Nash
equilibriumS = (S1, . . . , Sk) in the corresponding PMVC game, such that: (1)X ′(v;S) =
X(v;p); and (2) for all a ∈ X(v;p), p˜(a) = p(a), where p˜ is the induced price vector
for S.
Proof. For convenience, let B = X(v;p). As before, we let the strategy profile in the
corresponding PMVC game be S = (S1, . . . , Sk), where Si = B∩Ai, for i = 1, . . . , k.
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We begin by proving part (2) of the theorem. Suppose that there is an item a ∈ B
such that p(a) 6= ma(B \ a). If p(a) > ma(B) = v(B) − v(B \ a), then v(B \ a) −
p(B \ a) > v(B)− p(B), implying that the buyer would not buy item a, contradicting
our assumption that a ∈ B.
Assume now that p(a) < ma(B). Letting p′ denote the vector resulting by replac-
ing p(a) in p with ma(B \ a), we clearly have that ub(B,p′) = ub(B \ a,p′). We now
prove the following claim:
Claim. ub(B \ a,p′) ≥ ub(T,p′), for all T ⊆ B \ a.
Proof. Let (B \ a) \ T = {c1, . . . , cm}, and let Pt = (B \ a) \ {c1, . . . , ct} for
all t = 1, . . . ,m. Then ub(B \ a,p′) ≥ ub(Pt,p′). We prove the claim inductively.
Suppose the claim is true for t < m: ub(B \ a,p′) ≥ ub(Pt,p′). We now show that the
same inequality holds for t+ 1 as well:
ub(Pt+1,p
′) = v(Pt+1)− p
′(Pt+1) = v(Pt)− p
′(Pt)− (mct+1(Pt+1)− p(ct+1))
≤ ub(Pt,p
′)− (mct+1(B)− p(ct+1)) ≤ ub(Pt,p
′)
where the first inequality follows from submodularity, and the second inequality follows
from the fact that p(ct+1) ≤ mct+1(B) as we have previously shown. ⊓⊔
Therefore, the vendor who owns a can increase his payoff by setting the price of item
a to any value between p(a) and ma(B), contradicting the equilibrium state.
What is left to prove is that S is a Nash equilibrium in the PMVC game. Note that
we can assume w.l.o.g. the price of all products which are not sold is v(A∗)+1, as they
remain unsold and continue to contribute nothing to the buyer or seller. Now, suppose S
is not a Nash equilibrium, and that there is a player i, which can benefit from changing
his set of sold items from Si to S′i, which would result in a different vector of induced
prices p˜′ = (p˜′i, p˜′−i). We now argue that vendor i can make an identical improvement
in his revenue by changing his price vector from pi to p˜′i, contradicting p being a Nash
equilibrium. For convenience, we let B′ = (B \ Si) ∪ S′i, and B′′ = X(v; p˜′i,p−i).
To show this, first notice no other vendor would sell any previously unsold items as
a result; that is, X(v; p˜′i,p−i) \Ai ⊆ X(v; pi,p−i) \Ai (since prices of items in (A∗ \
Ai) ∩X(v; pi,p−i) are still v(A∗) + 1). So B′′ = X(v; p˜′i,p−i) ⊆ X ′(v;S′i,S′−i) =
B′. Thanks to submodularity, we have that for every a ∈ S′i, ma(B′) < ma(B′′).
Arguments similar to the ones given above (on p(a) = ma(B)) imply that player i
would sell all the items in S′i, and as the prices are unchanged from the PMVC game,
will make the same profit as in the PMVC game. As this increases the player’s profit in
the PMVC game, it would increase its profit in the VC game as well, in contradiction
to p being a Nash equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Discussion Note that we have not shown an exact equivalence between the two games:
the set of Nash equilibria in the VC game is a subset of the equilibria in the PMVC
game. However, Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 allow us to reason about our original
game to a considerable extent.
In contrast to the original model of Babioff et al. in which ni = 1 for all i =
1, . . . , k, we can show that in our more general game, there may not always be a pure
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Nash equilibrium. In order to do so, we provide an example of a VC game in the next
section with two vendors who each control two items. We show that this game does
not admit any pure Nash equilibrium by relating to its corresponding PMVC game,
using Theorem 4.3. Moreover, if we restrict ourselves to VC games that do admit pure
Nash equilibria, we can provide quantitative bounds on their quality. Specifically, when
restricting ourselves to VC games that have pure Nash equilibria, we provide a lower
bound on the price of stability of the PMVC game by analyzing an instance of the game.
As the optimal objective value (the valuation of the set that is bought by the buyer) is
always v(N), Theorem 4.3 immediately implies that the same lower bound applies to
the VC game. To complement our lower bound, we also provide an upper bound for the
price of anarchy, also ensuring tightness of bounds.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
In Section 4, we outlined several properties of the discrete PMVC game. We now de-
scribe how the PMVC game can serve as a surrogate to help analyze the stability of the
VC game, and the quality of equilibria in the VC game in cases when they exist.
5.1 Existence of pure Nash equilibria
We begin by showing that, as opposed to the special case where each vendor owns a
single item, some instances of our game may not actually admit pure Nash equilibria.
Proposition 5.1. There exists an instance of the VC game with two vendors, where
n1 = n2 = 2, that does not admit a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let A1 = {a, b} and A2 = {c, d}. We define the buyer’s valuation function v
according to Table 1 (the value in each cell is the valuation of the union of the sets given
at the head of the entry’s row and column).
∅ {c} {d} {c, d}
∅ 0 2.803 2.703 4.1045
{a} 3.203 5.404 5.304 6.5045
{b} 2.503 5.304 5.204 6.6045
{a, b} 4.4045 6.6045 6.5045 7.6045
Table 1. The buyer’s valua-
tion function
∅ {c} {d} {c, d}
∅ (0,0) (0,2.803) (0,2.7030) (0,2.703)
{a} (3.203,0) (2.601,2.201) (2.601,2.101) (2.4,2.301)
{b} (2.503,0) (2.501,2.801) (2.501,2.701) (2.5,2.701)
{a, b} (3.103,0) (2.501,2.2) (2.501,2.1) (2.1,2.1)
Table 2. The payoffs for
each vendor.
It is easy to verify that v is (strictly) non-decreasing and submodular. Now, consider
the PMVC game with the same item sets and valuation function v. For each strategy
profile (S1, S2), the mechanism prices the items according to their marginal contribu-
tions (Definition 4.1). Therefore, vendor payoffs are the sum of the prices of the items
offered. The vendors’ payoffs for each strategy profile are given in Table 2 (the first
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entry corresponds to the row player, Vendor 1, and the second to the column player,
Vendor 2). As is evident from Table 2, there is no pure Nash equilibrium in the PMVC
game. Theorem 4.3 then implies our proposition.
5.2 How bad can equilibria be?
Given the negative nature of Proposition 5.1, we now restrict attention to the subclass of
VC games that do admit pure Nash equilibria, and ask whether reasonable guarantees
on social welfare in such equilibria can be derived
More formally, let G = {G = (v, (A1, . . . , Ak)) : ∃ a pure Nash equilibrium in G}
be the set of VC games which admit a pure Nash equilibrium. Define the price of anar-
chy (PoA) as follows:
PoAG = max
G∈G
maxp∗ f(p
∗)
minp:p is a pure Nash equilibrium f(p)
PoA is a commonly used worst-case measure of the efficiency of the equilibria, and
in our case reflects the efficiency loss in G resulting from the introduction of strategic
pricing, as opposed to using a “centrally coordinated” pricing policy.
Theorem 5.2. Define the set of VC games Gm, such that G ∈ Gm iff (1) G has a pure
Nash equilibrium, and (2) maxki=1|Ai| = m. Then the PoA of Gm is at most Hm + 1,
where Hm is the m’th harmonic number.
Proof. Consider a game G = (v,A = (A1, . . . , Ak)} in Gm. It is enough to provide
a lower bound on the minimal social welfare of a pure Nash equilibrium in the corre-
sponding PMVC game: by Theorem 4.3, this will establish a lower bound on the social
welfare of a pure Nash equilibrium inG as well. So let S = (S1, . . . , Sk) be a pure Nash
equilibrium of the PMVC game. As v(·) is non-decreasing, we can assume without loss
of generality that |Si| = {ai}, for some ai ∈ Ai.
Again by the assumption that v(·) is non-decreasing, we know that the optimal
social welfare is obtained when all of A∗ is sold, so it is enough to upper bound v(A)
in terms of v(S).
We now show the following straightforward bound on the social welfare resulting
from switching from Si to Ai:
Lemma 5.3. v(Ai,S−i) ≤ v(∅,S−i) + Hni(v(Si,S−i) − v(∅,S−i)), for all i =
1, . . . , k.
Proof. As S is a Nash equilibrium, the profit from selling ai is higher than selling any
set B ⊆ Ai. Using the definition of the pricing mechanism of the PMVC game, we
know
v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i) ≥
∑
b∈B
mb(B \ b,S−i), for all B ⊆ Ai
By an averaging argument, this means that for all B ⊆ Ai, there exists an item
b ∈ B such that
1
|B|
(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i)) ≥ mb(B \ b,S−i) (1)
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The above implies that there is a relabelling of the items in Ai, so that: (1) Ai =
{b1, . . . , bni}, (2) b1 = a1, and (3) if set Pt = {b1, . . . , bt} ∪ S−i and P0 = S−i, the
following holds:
v(Ai,S−i) = v(∅,S−i) +
ni∑
t=1
mbt(Pt−1) ≤ v(∅,S−i) +
ni∑
i=1
1
t
(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i))
= v(∅,S−i) +Hni(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i))
where the first equality follows from a simple telescopic series, and the first inequality
follows from Eq. 1. ⊓⊔
Next, we show the following useful bound:
Lemma 5.4.
∑k
i=1 v(Ai,S−i) ≥ v(Ai,A−i) + (k − 1)v(Si,S−i)
Proof. L(t) = (A1, . . . , At, St+1, . . . , Sk), for t = 1, . . . , k, and L(0) = S. That is,
L(t) is the strategy profile resulting from replacing the length-t prefix of S with that of
A. We prove by induction that
t∑
i=1
v(Ai,S−i) ≥ v(L
(t)) + (t− 1)v(S)
and the lemma would follow by setting t = k.
The inequality clearly holds for t = 1, due to the monotonicity of v(·). Assume that
the inequality holds for t < k. Thus, for t+ 1, we have:
t+1∑
i=1
v(Ai,S−i) ≥ v(L
(t)) + (t− 1)v(S) + v(At+1,S−(t+1))
By the second definition of submodularity, we know v(L(t)) + v(At+1,S−(t+1)) ≥
v(L(t+1)) + v(S). Putting this in the preceding inequality concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
We can also prove an upper bound on the optimal social welfare in terms of the social
welfare of S. By the above two lemmas, we get:
v(A) ≤
k∑
i=1
v(Ai,S−i)− (k − 1)v(S)
≤
k∑
i=1
v(∅,S−i) +
k∑
i=1
Hni(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i))− (k − 1)v(S)
≤
k∑
i=1
v(Si,S−i) +
k∑
i=1
Hni(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i))− (k − 1)v(S)
= v(S) +
k∑
i=1
Hni(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i)),
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where the third inequality follows from the monotonicity of v(·).
By submodularity and that ni ≤ m for i = 1, . . . , k,
v(A) ≤ v(S) +Hm
k∑
i=1
(v(Si,S−i)− v(∅,S−i))
≤ v(S) +Hmv(S) = v(S)(Hm + 1),
which establishes our upper bound on the PoA.
We also give an example of a game with a pure Nash equilibrium that matches the above
bound.
Theorem 5.5. There exists a game in Gm with a price of anarchy of Hm.
Proof. Our counter-example is obtained by making the bound of Lemma 5.3 tight. Con-
sider a game G = (v,A = (A1, . . . , Ak)), in which |Ai| = m, for i = 1, . . . , k.
We define the valuation function as follows. For a strategy profileT = (T1, . . . , Tk),
we set v(T) =
∑k
i=1 ℓ(Ti), where ℓ(Ti) = 0 if |Ti| = 0, and otherwise we set
ℓ(Ti) = H|Ti|. Observe that the vendors are all symmetric, and that furthermore, the
payoffs only depend on their own prices.
We now consider the following strategy profile p. Pick an arbitrary item ai from
each Ai, for i = 1, . . . , k, and set p(ai) = 1. Price the remaining items at v(A∗) + 1.
Note that the payoff of each vendor is precisely 1.6
It is easy to see that p is a pure Nash equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that it is not,
and let i be an arbitrary vendor. Then he has an alternative pricing p′i 6= pi, such that
deviating to it would improve his payoff of 1. Suppose that the set of items being bought
under a deviation to p′i is B = X(v; p′i,p′−i), such that
∑
a∈B p(a) > 1. Then there
exists an item b ∈ B, such that p(b) > 1/|B|. But then by the definition of the valuation
function we have:
ℓ(B)− p(B) = H|B| − p(B \ b)− p(b) < H|B|−1 − p(B \ b)
contradicting the assumption that the buyer ends up buying set B. ⊓⊔
Note that the above construction can be extended to show that the Price of Stability
(PoS) is identical:
Corollary 5.6. The Price of Stability of the class of games Gm is Ω(Hm).
Sketch of Proof Use the construction in the proof for Proposition 5.5, but set ℓ(Ti) =
1 if |Ti| = 1, and ℓ(Ti) = H|Ti| − ǫ, if |Ti| > 1, for sufficiently small ǫ. It is not hard
to show that the aforementioned pure Nash equilibrium is the only Nash equilibrium. A
similar bound follows. ⊓⊔
6 If the buyer is not maximal, we can decrease the prices of the ai’s by some small ǫ.
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6 Special Case: Product Categories
A particular VC gane of interest is one in which have classes of items that are roughly
equivalent; as such the buyer is interested in at most one item from each class (e.g.,
TV sets of a certain size, with different manufacturers and sets of feature). Items is
different classes however are “unrelated” so the buyer’s valuation for any set of items
is additive across these classes. This scenario reflects the common case of shops selling
very similar products, of which the buyer only needs one, and tries to understand how
the model’s pricing behaviour.
Definition 6.1. A Category-Divided Substitutable-Product Vendor Competition game
(CDSP-VC) is a VC game with a buyer that has a category-product-substitutable valu-
ation function:
– A∗ is partitioned into r pairwise-disjoint sets, T (1), . . . , T (r). That is, T (i)∩T (j) =
∅ for i 6= j, and ⋃ri=1 T (i) = A∗. We refer to each set T (j) for j = 1, . . . , r, as a
category.
– For S ⊆ A∗, v(S) =
∑r
i=1 v(S ∩ T
(i)).
– For S ⊆ A∗ and 1 ≤ i ≤ r, v(S ∩ T (i)) = maxa∈S∩T (i)v(a).
Due to the additivity of different item classes, we can focus on the pricing dynamic
within a specific category and easily generalize the results.
Observation 6.2 For a category T (j), regardless of the other vendors’ strategies, no
vendor can profit by selling any items other than his most valuable one in category
T (j).
Proof. As the buyer only buys a single item from each category, vendors can make
positive revenue from at most one item. Consider a vendor i and category T (j) such
that Ai ∩ T (j) 6= ∅. Suppose that a ∈ argmaxb∈T (j)∩Ai v(b), and consider a strategy
profile p. For any item b ∈ (Ai \ a) ∩ T (j), if b ∈ X(v; pi,p−i), then if vendor i
switches to a price vector p′i, which prices a the same as b and prices b at v(A∗) + 1,
then surely a ∈ X(v; p′i,p−i), and the player’s profit does not decrease.
The above observation implies that within every category, each of the vendors is better
off effectively trying to sell his highest valued item. In other words, we can assume
without loss of generality, that for every vendor i and category T (j), the vendor can pick
an item a(j)i ∈ argmaxa∈T (j)∩Ai v(a) (if such item exists) and set p(b) = v(A∗) + 1,
for all b 6= a(j)i , without incurring a loss as a result. Therefore, this reduces our game to
r independent special cases of the VC game, in which each vendor owns a single item.
We turn to the result given by Babaioff et al. [3] (Theorem 3.1 in the preliminar-
ies). Their result implies the following characterization of the prices in a pure Nash
equilibrium.
Corollary 6.3. Every CDSP-VC game has a pure Nash equilibrium of the following
form. For every categoryT (j), let c(j)i = argmaxa∈(T (j)∩Ai) v(a), andw = argmaxi c(j)i .
Let b(j) = argmaxa∈(T (j)\Aw) v(a) or b
(j) = 0 if |T (j)| = 1. Then p(c(j)w ) =
v(c
(j)
w ) − b(j), and for every player i 6= w, p(c(j)i ) = 0. For all other items a ∈ T (j),
p(a) = v(A∗) + 1.
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Proof. Once we know that each player sells only a single product, products that are not
sold need to be priced high, and the rest of the result stems from Theorem 3.1, as the
above difference constitutes the marginal contribution of the item c(j).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In analyzing the multi-item, multi-vendor problem, we began by defining a discrete
game, which allowed us to consider a related case on the road to analyzing the scenario
of a “multiple item per vendor” game. The main property of the discrete game was to
transform player strategies from pricing, to selecting what items to sell. To paraphrase
Clausewitz’s famous dictum, displaying (what to sell) became pricing by other means.
Utilizing this discrete game, we were able to prove that a multi-item, multi-vendor
game with submodular buyer valuations does not necessarily have a Nash equilibrium
(unlike the “single item per vendor” model), and furthermore, even when an equilib-
rium exists, the equilibrium may provide only a logarithmic price of anarchy (again,
unlike the single item per vendor model). Building on these results, we showed that in
a particular (yet, in our view, common) category-substitute model, there will always be
an efficient pure Nash equilibrium.
There are many open problems in this area, even before the “holy grail” of pricing
multi-item multi-buyer scenarios. We believe that there is a need to establish the char-
acteristics of valuation functions that guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
This is true both in our scenario, where even when assuming submodular functions a
Nash equilibrium is not assured, as well as in simpler scenarios, such as the one item
per vendor model, where, while equilibrium is assured for submodular valuations, it is
not known if that is a characterization of the properties required for an equilibrium.
Adding more buyer valuations changes the model significantly, as vendors do not
simply construct some “buyer in expectation” and act according to it, but rather have a
wider range of options to pursue (primarily bundling). Perhaps using a metric to define
a set of similar, yet not identical, buyers, it might be possible to build on our results (and
those of others), and construct extensions to the current model incorporating multiple
buyers.
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